Incentivizing Participation in Peer-to-Peer Ride-Sharing Platform

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1 Problem Description

By providing more flexible commuting options than public transportation and private vehicles, on-demand ride-hailing and ride-sharing platforms have become increasingly popular in urban areas. However, the availability and affordability of on-demand transportation remain much more limited in sub-urban and rural areas. In practice, an overwhelming majority of commuting trips rely on self-driving with private vehicles. An increasingly popular option to promote alternative forms of mobility in non-urban areas lies in peer-to-peer (P2P) ride-sharing: by bringing together commuters traveling along similar routes at similar times, P2P ride-sharing can enhance mobility while reducing the costs of transportation, traffic congestion, and greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, P2P ride-sharing can also improve access to basic needs for disadvantaged populations with limited car ownership.

To be successful, P2P ride-sharing platforms require effective algorithms to match rider requests with available drivers. The topic of matching in ride-sharing platforms has attracted considerable research interest in recent years Ozkan and Ward [2017]; Bertsimas et al. [2019]; Santì et al. [2014]; Bei and Zhang [2018]; Alonso-Mora et al. [2017], building upon related problems such as the dial-a-ride problem (DARP) Cordeau [2006]; Parragh et al. [2010] and the vehicle routing problem with time windows (VRPTW) Cordeau et al. [2007], matching in spatial-temporal networks, and is sometimes studied jointly with the topic of pricing Bimpikis et al. [2016]. However, there is only limited research for P2P ride-sharing without direct payments from riders to drivers Masoud and Jayakrishnan [2017], which can provide viable solutions for a community, e.g., the community of residents from close-by regions and employees of the same company, featuring drivers who have their own travel plans and are willing to share part of their trips with riders. Moreover, most existing work in matching in P2P ride-sharing only considers the flexibility windows of the drivers and riders (“users”, henceforth) as constraints and ignores users’ preferences and incentives for participation. In addition, the predominant objective used in this setting is to minimize total costs (e.g., travel costs and inconvenience costs). However, such approaches do not capture the impact of matching decisions on individual users, including the fairness
among users and whether or not the users will accept the matching outcome. In this work, we address these limitations.

In contrast to previous work, we focus on matching riders and drivers in P2P ride-sharing without payment and study the problem from a user-centric perspective, with the objective of balancing system-wide efficiency and user satisfaction. We elevate users’ preferences as a first-order concern by considering the users’ preferred travel times and modeling drivers’ altruism—motivated by the community-based P2P context. Furthermore, we explicitly consider the fairness and stability of the matching outcome. Fairness is formalized by guaranteeing that every rider is matched with at least a threshold probability. Stability is formalized by guaranteeing that users have no incentive to reject the current matching and take an alternative transportation option on his own or engage in independently shared rides outside of the platform. We develop a multi-objective framework that quantifies the trade-offs between efficiency, fairness, and stability.

2 Methodology

First, to compute a matching between drivers and riders to maximize system-wise efficiency, we extend the Request-trip-vehicle (RTV) framework from Alonso-Mora et al. [2017] to incorporate users’ preferred times in P2P ride-sharing; the resulting model is computationally complex, and we propose a pruning algorithm to enhance its performance. Second, we formalize the notions of fairness and stability in P2P ride-sharing building upon a user utility model that incorporates altruism. We also design algorithms for computing efficient solution given fairness and stability constraints. Here we provides a high-level description of our models and algorithms. More detailed description can be found in the corresponding publications.

In our basic model, each rider and driver is characterized by his origin, destination, a time window describing the earliest possible departure time and latest possible arrival time, and value of the trip. In addition, we consider his preferred departure time and his maximum acceptable detour time. The goal is to match the drivers to disjoint subsets of riders and determine the schedule for each driver (an ordered sequence of node-time pairs describing how a single driver travels to pick up and drop off each rider matched to him) so as to minimize the total travel cost for all the participants.

The RTV framework has three main parts: (a) construction of all feasible \((d, S)\) pairs where \(d\) is a driver and \(S\) is a subset of riders; (b) computation of the minimum cost \((c_{dS})\) for each feasible pair \((d, S)\); and (c) computation of the cost-minimizing matching. We adopt this framework to our problem. The main challenge in applying the framework to our problem lies in (b). Since we incorporate the novel aspect of users’ preferred times, existing approaches cannot be directly applied and we propose a novel algorithm TripCost for computing \(c_{dS}\).

More specifically, in part (a), for each driver \(d\), we incrementally construct a list of subsets of riders that are feasible with \(d\) by gradually increasing the size of the subset. In each step, we add one rider to an existing feasible subset \(S\) of size \(h - 1\), getting a subset \(S'\) of size \(h\). If the subsets of \(S'\) with \(h - 1\) riders are all feasible with \(d\), i.e., already in the list, algorithm TripCost of part (b) is called to further verify the
compatibility of $S'$. When no more subsets with size $h$ can be constructed, we will construct subsets with size $h + 1$. After constructing subsets of sizes $h \leq |R|$ where $R$ is the total number of riders, we obtain the set of feasible $(d, S)$ pairs.

For part (b), we develop TripCost$(d, S)$, a novel tree-search based algorithm to compute $c_{dS}$. Each node of the tree represents a partial route, i.e., an ordered list of stops that the driver needs to visit, with the root representing the origin of the driver. In each step in the tree-search, we compute a lower bound of the cost of a full route that extends the current partial route by checking the must-visit stops remaining to be visited, and prune the branch if it is worse than the optimal solution found so far. Each leaf node represents a full route, and we need to determine the optimal timing to visit each stop. For this purpose, we design a dedicated mixed integer linear program (MILP) based on a constructed time-location graph with duplicated edges.

We also use two pruning methods to improve TripCost. First, we develop dynamic programming (DP)-based approach to compute a tighter lower bound of the route at the leaf node before computing TripMILP, which enables us to avoid unnecessary MILP computations. Intuitively, each state of the DP is a tuple containing location and time, and the DP computes the minimum cost to reach the location at that time based on previous states. Second, for each $(d, S)$ pair, we learn promising routes from the optimal schedule found for $(d, S')$ where $S' \subset S$ and $(d', S)$ where $d' \neq d$. By getting these promising routes, we avoid unnecessary tree search, thus the pruning efficiency increases significantly.

In part (c), we use a standard MILP for matching problem (same as in Alonso-Mora et al. [2017]) to find the cost-minimizing matching given the $c_{dS}$ for all the feasible $(d, S)$ pairs. The variables used in the MILP include $x_{dS}$ and $y_r$, $x_{dS} = 1$ if $(d, S)$ is matched and 0 otherwise; and $y_r = 1$ if rider $r$ is unsatisfied and 0 otherwise.

Further, we formalize fairness by maximizing the lowest probability of matching, across all riders in the system. We also consider stability at the individual-level, i.e., individual rationality. A driver or rider is individually rational (IR) if he/she does not get worse utility by participating in the matching system.

When considering fairness and stability requirements as constraints, finding the optimal matching becomes more challenging and the system-wise efficiency of the optimal matching will decrease. We designed an algorithm based on column generation to find the optimal matching satisfying $\theta$-fairness, i.e., the probability of a rider being matched is at least $\theta$ (as long as there is a driver that can be matched). We also modify the steps in the RTV-based algorithm to incorporate the IR constraint which can be described as a set of linear constraints.

### 3 Findings

We analyze the price of fairness and stability and show that the price of fairness and stability can be arbitrarily large, and moreover, fairness can result in a very unstable market without external incentives.

We evaluate the proposed algorithms through extensive experiments. Results show that solutions with enhanced fairness and stability can be found in shorter, or equivalent, computational times as solutions based on efficiency objectives exclusively. Further, we formalize fairness by maximizing the lowest probability of matching, across all riders in the system. We also consider stability at the individual-level, i.e., individual rationality. A driver or rider is individually rational (IR) if he/she does not get worse utility by participating in the matching system.

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thermore, suitable external incentives can result in fair and stable outcomes.

4 Conclusion

Unlike prior work, this project focuses on user-centric matching in P2P ride-sharing. (a) We propose a model that incorporates users’ preferred times; (b) we incorporate fairness and stability in our P2P ride-sharing model; (c) we provide theoretical and experimental results showing trade-offs between fairness, stability, and cost efficiency. While, in theory, the price of fairness and the price of stability can be arbitrarily large, experimental results show that fair and stable solutions can be obtained through moderate efficiency losses and in reasonable computational times.

Finally, we point out two potential future research directions. The first one is to design mechanisms to ensure incentive-compatibility, i.e., ensuring that there are no misreported values or misreported preferred times associated with uncoordinated incentives. Another direction is to study the trade-offs between fairness and stability in a broader area. Although the notion of fairness has been studied in many different contexts, there is little work investigating both fairness and stability in complex systems. Ultimately, incorporating both fairness and stability in analytic models can achieve more socially beneficial solutions and practical results.
References


